Brenda Joy Oliekan v. Ronald Y. Oliekan : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2005
Brenda Joy Oliekan v. Ronald Y. Oliekan : Reply
Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Rodney R. Parker; Snow, Christensen and Martineau; Attorney for Respondent/Appellee.
Stephen W. Cook; Cook and Associates, P.C.; Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Oliekan v. Oliekan, No. 20050310 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2005).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5726
FN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
BRENDA JOY OLIEKAN, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
RONALD Y. OLIEKAN, 
Respondent. 
Appeal No. 2005-0310-CA 
Lower Ct. No. 024902297 
APPELLANT'S SECOND BRIEF ON APPEAL 
(Reply and Answering Brief) 
Stephen W. Cook, USB # 0720 
COOK & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
323 South 600 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 595-8600 
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant 
Rodney R. Parker, USB # A4410 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
Attorney for Respondent/Appellee 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
rSLED 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
REPLY BRIEF 5 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CLEARLY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 
REJECTING PETITIONER'S LEGAL ARGUMENT THAT THE RETIRMENT 
INTERESTS BECAME TRANSMUTTED 5 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CLEARLY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 
ADOPTING THE SMITH MODEL OF DIVIDING THE PARTIES' IRA 
ACCOUNTS 7 
III. THE PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO A REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEE 
FOR TRIAL BELOW AS WELL AS ON APPEAL 10 
PETITIONER'S ANSWERING BRIEF 11 
I. THE TRIAL COURT COURT'S DECISION REGARDING THE DCP WAS 
CORRECT BUT ILLUSORY 11 
II. THE TRIAL COURT COURT'S DECISION REGARDING THE 
TEMPORARY ORDER WAS CORRECT BUT ILLUSORY 13 
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S ALIMONY AWARD WAS APPROPRIATE AND 
NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 16 
2 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY INCLUDING 
THE LENOX COLLECTION IN THE MARITAL ESTATE 18 
V. THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES, THOUGH 
INADEQUATE, WAS NOT CLEARLY AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 19 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 22 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 24 
3 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 80 P.3d 153, 154-155 (Ut. App. 2003) 15,16, 21 
Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877, 879 (Ut. App. 1995) 15 
Burge v. Facio. 88 P.3d 350, 352 (Ut. App. 2004) 16, 17 
Burleigh v. Turner, 388 P.2d 412 (Ut. 1964) 14 
Davis v. Davis. 76 P.3d 716, 718 (Ut. App. 2003) 15 
Dunn v.Dunn. 803 P.2d 1314 (Ut. App. 1990) 7 
Englert v. Englert. 576 P.2d 1274 (Ut. 1978 7, 21 
Gibbons v. Gibbons. 656 P.2d 407, 409 (Ut. 1982) 17 
In Re Hester. 856 P.2d 1048 (Or. App. 1991) 8 
Jarmillo v. Turner. 465 P.2d 343 (Ut. 1970) 14 
Mannv. Mann. 470 S.E. 2d 605 (Va. App. 1996) 8 
Painter v. Painter. 752 P.2d 907 (Ut. App. 1988) 14 
Paulone v. Paulone. 649 A.2d 691 (Pa. Super. 1994) 8 
Peterson v. Peterson. 748 P.2d 593, 594 (Ut. App. 1988) 18 
Rappleve v. Rappleve. 90 P.3d 348 (Ut. App. 1994) 6 
Shinkoskev v. Shinkoskev. 19 P.3d 1005, 1010-1011 (Ut. App. 2001) 19, 21 
Smith v. Smith. 22 S.W. 2d 140 (Tex. App. Houston 2000) 8 
Tanghe v. Tanghe. 115 P.3d 567 (Ak. 2005) 8 
4 
REPLY BRIEF 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CLEARLY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
BY REJECTING PETITIONER'S LEGAL ARGUMENT THAT 
THE RETIRMENT INTERESTS BECAME TRANSMUTTED. 
The Respondent responded to the Petitioner's argument regarding transmutation 
in a cavalier manner without addressing the merits of her argument. (See Respondent's 
Brief, page 29). The Petitioner's argument below, as it is on appeal, is that a court, in 
valuing and dividing marital assets, should adopt a legal theory that avoids speculation 
and assures fairness and accuracy. (See Appellant's Brief on Appeal, p. 29). Here, the 
Petitioner advocated the straight-forward valuation approach already approved by Utah's 
appellate courts of simply deducting the premarital values identified by PacifiCorp's 
Retirement Plans on Trial Exhibit P-4 from the values that existed on the date of trial. 
This approach would have been far more accurate and fair than the adoption of the Smith 
Model, a new theory advocated by Respondent, that was replete with problems from the 
very beginning. The trial court expressed openly on the record "that there isn't really any 
case law out there to guide me clearly" and that this case appeared to it to be one of "first 
impression." (Transcript, p. 343). The trial court admittedly struggled with which legal 
theory to apply. 
For obvious reasons, the Respondent did not address any of the five undisputed 
events that caused transmutation in this case, as identified on pages 30-31 of Appellant's 
Brief on Appeal. Instead, the Respondent argued that the trial court expressly found that 
the "funds were separately identifiable." (See Respondent's Brief, p. 29). Such is not 
true and the Respondent's citation to the transcript, p. 228, actually supports the 
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Petitioner's position regarding transmutation. In fact, the trial court glossed over the 
Petitioner's transmutation argument in its zeal to adopt the Smith Model and divide the 
IRA accounts based upon equal years of service. In doing so, the trial court ignored the 
five transmutation events described in the Appellant's Brief. By adopting the Smith 
Model, the trial court ignored the fact (despite its own finding) that the overwhelming 
growth in the retirement interests, or $447,964.18, occurred during the parties' marriage. 
It ignored the fact that $116,889.66 (roughly one-fourth) occurred in 2001 when the 
parties agreed to PacifiCorp's WTRP and retire early with enhanced benefits. The trial 
court ignored the fact that all retirement interests were cashed out and rolled over into 
IRA accounts and existed four years prior to the divorce in this case. It ignored the fact 
that transmutation occurred by the multitudinous withdraws by the Respondent in 
violation of the court's own order. 
The Petitioner's point is very simple. In determining what legal approach to use 
to value premarital and marital interests, as the court must do, why use a new legal theory 
to value and divide marital assets that is diseased from the start? Why use a new legal 
theory to value and divide marital assets that cannot possibly account for the events of 
transmutation at all? Why use any model that must by necessity contain a myriad of 
problematical mathematical assumptions, as did the Smith Model? 
Instead, why not use a straight-forward valuation approach, already approved by 
Utah courts, that employs the actual figures and takes into consideration all of the events 
of transmutation? Clearly, the Respondent understood this dilemma and chose not to 
respond to Petitioner's transmutation argument at all. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT CLEARLY ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION BY ADOPTING THE SMITH MODEL 
OF DIVIDING THE PARTIES' IRA ACCOUNTS. 
The legal decision concerning which legal theory to adopt for the purpose of 
valuing and dividing the parties' IRA accounts was a significant legal decision. On the 
one hand, using the straight-forward valuation approach advocated by the Petitioner, the 
Petitioner should have been awarded one-half of the increase accrued during marriage or 
the sum of $223,982.18. On the other hand, using the Smith Model advocated by the 
Respondent, and spreading out the growth of the funds over 31.90 years, the Petitioner 
was only awarded the sum of $66,274.60 and deprived of the contributions and growth 
that occurred during the marriage. Contrary to the Respondent's argument, this decision 
was a legal decision and not a factual decision. (Transcript, p. 81, 343, 765). Questions 
of law are reviewed for correctness. Rappleye v. Rappleye, 90 P.3d 348 (Ut. App. 1994). 
The Respondent advocated the Smith Model, or a coverture fraction, to value and 
divide the IRA accounts, for an obvious reason. It awarded him a disproportionate 
amount of the marital estate. By spreading out the large increase in value through 
contributions and growth that occurred during the marriage, or $447,964.18, over a 
period of 30.9 years, the Petitioner was deprived of her right to receive marital property 
accrued during the marriage and appreciation on that marital property as directed by the 
court in Dunn v. Dunn, 803 P.2d 1314 (Ut. App. 1990) and Englert v. Englert 576 P.2d 
1274 (Ut. 1978). The Respondent offers no rationale to justify this inequitable result. 
The absurdity of applying a coverture fraction to this case is illustrated by the 
testimony of Respondent's own expert, Roger Smith. Mr. Smith testified that, using his 
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coverture model, he fixed the value of Respondent's premarital interest as of 2/13/93 in 
the DCP at $119,234.26 and the Basic at $168,475.49, for a total of $278,709.75. 
(Defendant's Exhibit 3, page 1, or Addendum E to Appellant's Breif on Appeal). 
Compare these figures with the values placed on Respondent's interests by PacifiCorp as 
of 2/13/93, or $67,994.24 for the DCP and $46,148.94 for the Basic, for a total of 
$114,143.18. (Plaintiffs Exhibit 4 or Addendum C to Appellant's Brief on Appeal). 
When asked if he thought PacifiCorp would have given the Respondent the amount of 
money Mr. Smith identified as Respondent's premarital interests, had Respondent 
separated from the company on 2/13/93, he admitted that PacifiCorp would not have 
done so. (Testimony of Roger Smith, p. 235). 
The Respondent urges this Court to apply Woodward to the facts of this case. In 
doing so, Respondent misses the mark. Woodward was a case involving future undefined 
interests—interests that had yet to be accrued or determined in a defined benefit plan. 
The Utah Supreme Court properly determined that future undefined interests, those that 
accrue post divorce, may be divided by the application of the coverture fraction. But this 
case does not involve future undefined interests. All of the retirement interests in this 
case had already been reduced to sums certain and placed in IRA accounts that were 
created four (4) years preceding the divorce in this case. The sole issue for the trial court 
was to identify the values of the premarital interests from marital interests and divide 
them. Using a coverture fraction to value the parties' interests in this case (both 
premarital and marital) by the trial court was improper. To the best of Petitioner's 
research, all courts that have considered this question have found a clear abuse of 
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discretion where a trial court employed a coverture fraction to value martial assets 
already accrued. The Respondent's attempts to distinguish Mann v. Mann, 470 S.E. 2d 
605 (Va. App. 1996); Smith v. Smith, 22 S.W. 2d 140 (Tex. App. Houston 2000); In Re 
Hester, 856 P.2d 1048 (Or. App. 1991); Tanghe v. Tanghe, 115 P.3d 567 (Ak. 2005) and 
Paulone v. Paulone, 649 A.2d 691 (Pa. Super. 1994) are clearly disingenuous. The 
principle of law enunciated in each of these cases, that coverture fractions may only be 
used to divide future undefined interests, and not value past accrued interests, applies 
fundamentally to the facts of this case and it was clear error for the trial court to use a 
coverture fraction in this case. 
The Respondent attempts to undermine the fact that his premarital interests in his 
DCP and Basic Plan were only $67,994.24 and $46,148.94, respectively, as shown on 
Petitioner's Exhibit 4. (Addendum C to Appellant's Brief on Appeal). In essence, the 
Respondent's argument is that Exhibit P-4 did not represent the "true value" of his 
premarital interests because Respondent could not have retired then and was required to 
work additional years before the total value of his retirement plans would become 
manifest. (Respondent's Brief, p. 26). This argument does not hold true factually or 
legally. Factually, the Respondent's argument fails because the Respondent's own expert 
testified that the figures represented by Petitioner's Exhibit P-4 is all that Respondent 
would have received had he separated from PacifiCorp on 2/13/93. (Testimony of Roger 
Smith, Transcript, p. 231). Mr. Smith also testified that Exhibit P-5 represents the value 
of the two accounts had the Respondent retired on 2/13/93. (Testimony of Roger Smith, 
Transcript, p. 251). Therefore, Exhibit P-4 clearly represents "true value" or fair market 
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value. The fact that PacifiCorp's retirement plans provided greater benefits for longer 
service during the marital years after 2/13/93 does not assist the Respondent in his 
argument. These events occurred during the marital years and must be considered part of 
the marital estate. Moreover, most retirement plans, including PacifiCorp's, contain 
formulae that reward workers having longevity as they approach retirement age, and 
therefore such is a fact without any distinction. 
In the Appellant's Brief on Appeal, pages 37-42, the Petitioner described flaws in 
the Smith Model, assuming a coverture fraction could be used to value past accrued 
premarital and marital interests. She had also pointed out the flaws in the Smith Model to 
the trial court. Recognizing that the Smith Model had these flaws, the trial court made 
"equitable adjustments" which the Petitioner claimed was illusory. 
The Respondent, in his cross-appeal, has appealed the trial court's decision 
regarding these alleged equitable adjustments. Because the Respondent has the burden of 
proof on these issues, the Petitioner will address the Respondent's arguments in her 
Answering Brief, below. 
III. THE PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO 
A REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEE FOR 
TRIAL BELOW AS WELL AS ON APPEAL. 
The Respondent did not address the Petitioner's primary argument that the trial 
court erred by awarding the Petitioner only limited fees because the parties could not 
agree on any issue to be decided by the court. Also, the Respondent did not address the 
Petitioner's primary request that fees be awarded on appeal if successful. Instead, the 
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Respondent argues an entirely different point. The Respondent argues the trial court 
erred in awarding any attorney's fees below. 
Therefore, presumptively, the Respondent does not quarrel with the Petitioner's 
primary claims on appeal and admits that the trial court erred in awarding limited fees, if 
any fees were warranted, and admits that additional fees should be awarded on appeal if 
the Petitioner is successful. Since the Respondent has the burden of proof on whether the 
trial court erred in awarding any fees, the Petitioner will address the Respondent's 
argument in her Answering Brief below. 
PETITIONER'S ANSWERING BRIEF 
I. THE TRIAL COURT COURT'S DECISION 
REGARDING THE DCP WAS CORRECT BUT ILLUSORY. 
Having adopted the Smith Model, the trial court recognized that it was fraught 
with problems nevertheless. In short, the Smith Model used a "modified" coverture 
fraction and did not include the total length of the marriage as a denominator, did not 
allocate the enhanced years of service awarded in the WFTP equally to the nominator and 
denominator, did not account for the fact the greatest wealth was created during the 
marriage, and failed to distinguish between active and passive appreciation. These were 
issues that were discussed in dept during both off-record discussions (see Transcript, p. 
731, 767, 769) as well as during on-record discussion. (Transcript, p. 769, 770-775). 
In an effort to ameliorate the defects in the Smith Model, the trial court made 
certain decisions on disputed issues that it called "equitable adjustments" implying that it 
was ruling in favor of the Petitioner on the disputed issues in order to overcome the 
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defects in the Smith Model. (See Findings of Fact, No. 15 and 31). One such dispute 
involved the proper interpretation of the DCP Plan. 
The DCP is described at pages 9-10 and 38-39 of Appellant's Brief on Appeal. It 
is found in Exhibit R-13, pages 47-52, and is referred to as "Restated Appendix D to 
PacifiCorp Retirement Plan." Below, the Respondent initially admitted that the DCP was 
a marital asset, but changed his position on the first day of trial. (Transcript, p. 79). The 
Respondent's new argument was that the DCP plan document showed that the benefits 
were frozen prior to the parties' marriage and therefore was entirely premarital. 
However, the Respondent's argument was premised upon an erroneous and incomplete 
reading of the DCP plan documents. The plan itself did not "freeze" benefit levels as 
suggested by the Respondent.1 In fact, instead of calculating benefit levels based upon 
the employee's highest annual base salary at the time of retirement, the benefit level was 
based upon (A) the employee's highest annual base salary as of 1/1/90, and (B) certain 
specified enhancements based upon increases in salary between 1/1/90 and 12/31/93 
called "Earnings Classes", and other factors. (See ^ 4.5 of the DCP. Moreover, an 
employee is nevertheless required to continue to work and put in years of service and be 
at least 55 years of age to be eligible for any benefits and had to be 65 years of age to 
qualify for 100% of the DCP benefits. 
1
 Indeed, all defined benefit plans are "frozen" in the sense that they provide defined benefits to 
eligible employees at retirement and the defined benefits rarely change over time. The 
Respondent's own expert, Roger Smith, testified that defined benefit plans provide benefits that 
"remains relatively constant over a period of years." (Transcript, p. 220-221). 
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In the case at hand, the Respondent was only 46 years of age when he married the 
Petitioner. In order to receive any percentage of the DCP benefits, he had to work nine 
(9) additional service years and those nine service years occurred during the marriage 
between the parties. In addition, the Respondent would not have qualified for the DCP 
but for the enhancement of two Active years offered him by PacifiCorp's WFTP in the 
year 2000, during the parties' marriage. (See explanation of WFTP at page 11-12 of 
Appellant's Brief on Appeal). The Respondent's efforts to escape the plain language of 
the plan, and to ignore the fact the Respondent had to remain employed in order to 
qualify for benefits, is disingenuous. 
There is no question that the trial court correctly ruled on the issue involving the 
DCP. The DCP was not an entirely premarital asset. It was appropriate for the trial court 
to find, as it in f^ 31 of its Findings that "the parties work together during the years of 
marriage allowed Mr. Oliekan to retire, and respondent was required to be an employee 
on the date of retirement in order to qualify for the benefit." The trial court's ruling 
should not be disturbed. However, the trial court was wrong to characterize its ruling as 
an "equitable adjustment" implying that the trial court was compensating for a flaw in the 
Smith Model, or that it awarded the Petitioner more than what she was otherwise entitled 
to receive. In that respect, the trial court's ruling was illusory. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT COURT'S DECISION REGARDING 
THE TEMPORARY ORDER WAS CORRECT BUT ILLUSORY. 
The trial court's second "equitable adjustment" involved the Temporary Order. 
On February 4, 2003, two years prior to trial, the trial court entered a Temporary Order. 
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(Addendum F to Appellant's Brief on Appeal). The trial court ordered that each party be 
responsible for their own debts and obligations arising after their separation on December 
15, 2002. Paragraph 8 of the Temporary Order provided, "Each party is restrained and 
enjoined from selling, gifting, transferring, alienating, pledging, or otherwise disposing of 
the parties' marital assets." There was no dispute below, nor is there any on appeal, that 
the IRA accounts were marital assets. 
Notwithstanding the clear and unmistakable language of the restraining order 
contained in the Temporary Order, the Respondent continued to use the parties' IRA 
accounts as his own personal piggy bank. Not only did the Respondent continue to take 
withdrawals from the IRAs in the amount of $2,100.00 each month, he took other 
withdrawals totaling $59,922.89 to pay his own attorney (Transcript, p. 476, 522), make 
loans to his girlfriend (Transcript, p. 522), and to otherwise live a lavish lifestyle of 
traveling, etc., while, at the same time, having earned annual income from his job in 
excess of $60,000.00. (Transcript, p. 517-519 and Trial Exhibit D-17). The undisputed 
evidence at trial below was the Petitioner was unaware of any of the Respondent's post-
Temporary-Order withdrawals until shortly before trial when they were disclosed. 
(Transcript, p. 359, 363). And, it was undisputed at trial below that the Respondent never 
advised the Petitioner of the post-Temporary-Order withdrawals. (Transcript, p. 519). 
At trial, the Petitioner claimed that the withdrawals clearly violated the 
Temporary Order and were wrongful withdrawals under Painter v. Painter, 752 P.2d 907 
(Ut. App. 1988)(withdrawals in violation of a temporary order must be restored by the 
errant party). Despite its plain language, the Respondent argued that the Temporary 
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Order "contemplated" the withdrawals. (Transcript, p. 757). While the trial court 
rejected the Respondent's argument, the trial court did so by indicating its ruling was an 
equitable adjustment, again implying that it was compensating for a flaw in the Smith 
Model, or that the Petitioner was getting more than what she was entitled. (Transcript, p. 
770). While the trial court's legal ruling was correct, its implication that it was somehow 
compensating for defects, or that the Plaintiff got more than what was correct, was wrong 
and illusory. 
Now, for the first time on appeal, the Respondent claims that the trial court's 
ruling "was necessarily based on an implicit finding of contempt" and claims the trial 
court erred by not requiring clear and convincing evidence that a valid order existed, that 
the Respondent knew of the order, and that he disobeyed the order. (Brief of 
Respondent/Cross-Appellant, p. 35). This was never argued before the trial court and 
Appellant objects to it being raised for the first time on appeal. The Respondent should 
not now be allowed to raise the issue for the first time on appeal, where it was never 
considered by the trial court. Burleigh v. Turner, 388 P.2d 412 (Ut. 1964) and JarmiUo v. 
Turner, 465 P.2d 343 (Ut. 1970). 
In any event, and without waiving her objection, the evidence before the trial 
court clearly and convincingly showed that the Respondent was culpable of contempt. 
He was aware of the Temporary Order. He and his attorney were present when the Order 
was entered by the Court and the Respondent's own attorney approved the Temporary 
Order as to form. (Addendum F to Appellant's Brief on Appeal). The Respondent 
admitted he did not seek permission from the Court to make the withdrawals (Transcript, 
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p. 507). With over $60,000.00 in earned income, the Respondent clearly had the ability 
to abide by the Court's Temporary Order and there was no excuse to use the IRA 
accounts as his own piggy bank. (Transcript, p. 517-519 and Trial Exhibit D-17). With 
these undisputed facts, the trial court was within its discretion to order that the 
Respondent make whole the defalcated accounts. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S ALIMONY AWARD WAS 
APPROPRIATE AND NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
This Court should review the trial court's alimony award for abuse of discretion. 
Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 80 P.3d 153, 154-155 (Ut. App. 2003) and Davis v. Davis, 
76 P.3d 716, 718 (Ut. App. 2003). "'Trial courts have considerable discretion in 
determining alimony.. .and [determinations of alimony] will be upheld on appeal unless a 
clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated.'" Davis, supra, quoting 
Breinholt v. Breinholt 905 P.2d 877, 879 (Ut. App. 1995). 
The Respondent does not claim that the trial court failed to consider the 
appropriate factors enunciated by Bakanowski, supra, such as financial needs, ability to 
pay, etc. Indeed, the Respondent does not challenge the trial court's factual findings 
relative to alimony at all. (See Brief of Appellee/Cross-Appellant, p. 36). And, the 
Respondent does not marshal the evidence, as required by Burge v. Facio, 88 P.3d 350, 
352 (Ut. App. 2004) to demonstrate why the trial court's ruling regarding alimony 
resulted in "such a serious inequity... as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion." 
Bakanowski, supra. 
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Instead, the Respondent again raises two arguments that were never presented to 
the trial court. And, again, the Respondent objects to them being raised new on appeal. 
Without waiving the concerns relative to the standard of review discussed above, 
and without waving the Petitioner's objections to new arguments on appeal, the Petitioner 
submits that the two arguments raised by the Respondent lack merit. The first argument 
is that the Petitioner's standard of living didn't change and therefore no alimony should 
be awarded. Again, the Respondent did not marshal the facts. While admitting the 
Petitioner lost the equity to her own premarital home in the amount of $7,000.00, the 
Respondent fails to point out that the Petitioner must now live on one limited income 
alone, was forced to find new housing because of the court-ordered sale of the parties' 
residence, and could not enjoy vacations as she did while married to the Respondent. 
The Respondent also fails to point out that the trial court improperly deducted from 
Respondent's income the debt of Debtscape which was entirely the Respondent's debt 
post-separation that he voluntarily incurred himself. (Findings of Fact, f 63). The 
Respondent also fails to point out that he engaged in an improper relationship with 
another woman causing the parties' marriage to disintegrate. (Id., If 64). 
The Respondent's second argument, that the trial court's treatment of the 
Respondent's $2,100.00 income was inconsistent, again was never presented to the trial 
court. Notwithstanding, the claim that the treatment of income was inconsistently treated 
by the trial court is factually and legally incorrect. What the Respondent fails to consider 
is that the trial court enjoined him from taking withdrawals from the parties' IRA 
accounts pending trial. Therefore, the trial court was correct in treating the $2,100.00 as 
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wrongful withdrawals prior to trial and as income of $2,100.00 after the trial when the 
injunction no longer applied. 
The Respondent has not shown such a clear abuse of discretion so that a manifest 
injustice occurred. This Court should affirm the alimony award. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION BY INCLUDING THE LENOX 
COLLECTION IN THE MARITAL ESTATE. 
The Respondent does not make the Lenox Collection issue a significant issue on 
appeal. The reason is because the point has little merit in light of the standard of review. 
"In order to revise the trial court's distribution of property in a divorce action, we must 
find that it 'works such a manifest injustice or inequity as to indicate a clear abuse of 
discretion.'" Burge v. Facio, 88 P.3d 350, 352 (Ut. App. 2004) quoting Gibbons v. 
Gibbons, 656 P.2d 407, 409 (Ut. 1982). "[I]n exercising their discretion in divorce 
actions, trial courts 'need be guided by the general purpose to be achieved by a property 
division, which is to allocate the property in a manner which bet serves the needs of the 
parties and best permits them to pursue their respective lives.'" Id., quoting Peterson v. 
Peterson, 748 P.2d 593, 594 (Ut. App. 1988). And, to challenge a trial court's finding of 
fact, "[t]he challenging party must marshal all relevant evidence presented at trial which 
tends to support the findings and demonstrate why the findings are clearly erroneous." 
Id. 
In this case, the Respondent has failed to marshal the evidence concerning the 
property division and demonstrate that that the trial court's division of the marital estate 
was clearly abusive. Instead, the Respondent attempts to single out one property element 
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and claim that it was erroneously included in the marital estate. This is an improper 
argument and should be rejected on its face. 
Without waiving the objections noted above, the Petitioner points out that the 
Respondent failed to cite to record testimony that suggested the Lenox collection was not 
entirely premarital. For example, over two-thirds were purchased during the marriage for 
the parties. (Transcript, p. 726 and Trial Exhibit P-49). Further, for example, the 
Petitioner testified that the only Lenox items purchased for Respondent's mother were the 
bird items. (Transcript, p. 389). While they were gifts to the Respondent's mother, they 
were purchased by the Petitioner and Respondent together using marital funds. 
(Transcript, p. 727). The items were returned to the Petitioner and Respondent following 
the death of Respondent's mother. (Transcript, p. 412). Even if one were to isolate the 
Lenox collection from the overall distribution of the marital estate, the Court's finding in 
Paragraph 55 that the Lenox collection was entirely marital was not such a manifest 
abuse of discretion so as to operate an inequity. This is particularly true where it was the 
Respondent's burden of proof to demonstrate the Lenox collection was entirely 
premarital property. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S 
FEES, THOUGH INADEQUATE, WAS NOT 
CLEARLY AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
The decision to award attorney's fees and the amount thereof rests primarily in 
the sound discretion of the trial court; however, the trial court must base the award on 
evidence of the receiving spouse's financial need, the payor spouse's ability to pay, and 
the reasonableness of the requested fees. Shinkoskev v. Shinkoskey, 19 P.3d 1005, 1010-
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1011 (Ut. App. 2001). In this case, the trial court based its award on the Shinkoskey 
factors.2 (See Findings, f 60-64, and 65-69). On appeal, the Respondent does not contest 
the reasonableness of the fees, only whether it was based upon need and the ability to 
pay. 
Below, the evidence showed that the Petitioner had limited ability to pay any 
attorney's fees while the case progressed to trial. Even though her attorney's fees 
exceeded $20,194.00 through the fourth day of trial (Finding, ^ 65 and Transcript, p. 
353), she was only able to make token payments toward her attorney's fee bill. 
(Transcript, p. 418). Yet, at the same time, the Respondent violated the Temporary Order 
in this case and made withdrawals from the parties' IRA accounts to maintain his lavish 
lifestyle and, at the same time, pay his own attorney significant sums including $5,200.00 
for a retainer (Transcript, p. 476)3 and an additional $2,507.00 as trial approached. (Trial 
Exhibit 3, Exhibit 7; Addendum E to Appellant's Brief on Appeal). 
In addition, the Court considered the fact that the Respondent had large 
unexplained deposits to his checking account that did not coincide with his testimony 
regarding monthly income. (Transcript, p. 683-691). Among these deposits were 
deposits of $8,000.00 (Transcript, p. 683), $2,790.00 (Transcript, p. 685), $6,700.00 
(Transcript, p. 686), $1,188.49, and $4,858.00 (Transcript, p. 689) all occurring in the 
spring of 2004. 
2
 It is noteworthy that the Respondent drafted the Findings for the Court and there was no 
discussion below that the Findings, relative to attorney's fees, were inadequate. 
3
 Compared to Petitioner's retainer of $150.00. (Transcript, p. 418). 
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Below, the trial court found that the Petitioner had net income of $2,107.83 per 
month with $2,531.68 in monthly expenses. (Findings, f^ 60 and 62). It found that she 
had limited ability to earn income. (Finding, ^ 68). On the other hand, the Respondent 
had net income of $4,863.33 per month with $4,426.39 in expenses. (Findings, f^ 61 and 
63). And, as a consultant for PacifiCorp, he had a greater ability to earn income. 
(Findings, *(\ 6 and 68). And, although the trial court noted and "struggled" with the fact 
that the Respondent had voluntarily ran up his post-separation debt4 of over $600.00 a 
month that he used to maintain his lavish lifestyle, the Court nevertheless included the 
debt in his expenses. (Finding, ^ 63). 
In addition to the Respondent's monthly income, the Court also considered that 
the Respondent had large retirement assets whereas the Petitioner had limited retirement 
assets. (Finding, ]f 68). It was proper for the trial court to cite to the disparity in these 
retirement assets, and the need for the Petitioner to preserve her limited retirement assets, 
while awarding attorney's fees. See Bakanowski supra, where court approved 
consideration of preservation of a retirement account in the context of an alimony award. 
Therefore, the trial court properly considered the Petitioner's need and the 
Respondent's ability to pay. Shinkoskey, supra. The Respondent does not contest the 
reasonableness of the fees. 
Even assuming the trial court's findings regarding attorney's fees were too sparse, 
the remedy would be to remand to the trial court for appropriate findings, and, if fees 
4
 The "Debtscape" debt. 
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remained appropriate, to additionally award attorney's fees to the Petitioner for her 
appeal if she is successful in this appeal. Shinkoskey, supra, p. 1011. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
The Petitioner respectfully submits that the trial court's adoption of a new theory 
to divide retirement accounts was clearly erroneous, an abuse of discretion, and 
manifestly unjust. Instead of awarding her an equitable amount of the contributions and 
growth earned during the marital years as required by Dunn and Englert, the trial court 
adopted a flawed coverture fraction to spread out the contributions and earnings over a 
31.90 year period effectively depriving the Petitioner of $156,707.58 that should have 
been awarded to her. One can imagine the impact on valuing and dividing IRA accounts, 
401k accounts and similar accrued accounts by trial courts in the future, if the lower 
court's new theory is allowed to stand. It would eliminate a spouse's right to receive 
contributions, and earnings on those contributions, made during the marriage. 
While the trial court's legal decisions regarding the DCP and Temporary Orders 
were correct, they were illusory in suggesting she received anything more than what she 
was otherwise entitled by the rulings. 
The trial court's division of the parties' personal property was not an abuse of 
discretion, nor was its award of alimony. While the trial court's decision to award 
attorney's fee was not clearly erroneous, the trial court's limited award of attorney's fees 
was clearly erroneous. If successful on appeal, this Court should remand to the trial court 
for an award of attorney's fees incurred on appeal. 
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Dated this ( 1 day of January, 2006. 
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